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A collapse of the West-Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) would cause a sea level rise of 5-6 
metres, perhaps even within one hundred years, with catastrophic consequences. The 
probability of such a collapse is small but increasing with the rise of the atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gas and the resulting climate change. This paper 
investigates how the potential collapse of the WAIS affects the optimal rate of 
greenhouse gas emission control. We design a decision and learning tree in which 
decision are made about emission reduction at regular intervals. At the same time, the 
decision makers receive new information on the probability of a WAIS collapse and 
the severity of its impacts. The probability of a WAIS collapse is endogenous and 
contingent on greenhouse gas concentrations. We solve this optimisation problem by 
backward induction. We find that a potential WAIS collapse substantially bring the 
date of the optimal emission reduction forward and increases its amount if the 
probability is high enough, if the impacts are high enough, or if the decision maker is 
risk averse enough. We also find that, as soon as a WAIS collapse is a foregone fact, 
emission reduction falls to free up resource to prepare for adapting to the inevitable. 
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1. Introduction 
The possibility of a catastrophe is one of the main reasons for concern about climate 
change (Smith et al., 2001; Wright and Erickson, 2003). The climate is a non-linear 
system. It may be that the gradual change in the concentrations of greenhouse gases 
caused by human activities will bring about abrupt changes in atmosphere, ocean, or 
biosphere. Examples include the “runaway” greenhouse effect, in which climate 
change triggers massive releases of greenhouse gases, a shutdown of the thermohaline 
circulation, and the disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS), the topic 
of this paper. Although the process of disintegration is slow at a human time-scale, 
once it has been set in motion, there is no way of stopping the WAIS from 
disintegrating entirely. A WAIS collapse would lead to a sea level rise of 5-6 metre, 
but probably not faster than within the course of one century. A 5 metre sea level rise 
would have drastic impacts. This paper analyses how the risk of a WAIS collapse 
influences the optimal control of carbon dioxide emissions. 
Besides the uncertainty about the collapse of the WAIS, we also consider the 
uncertainty about the damage costs. Uncertainty interacts with irreversibility, another 
key feature of climate change decision-making. On the one hand, carbon dioxide 
emission reduction is a sunk cost to society. Sunk costs create an opportunity cost of 
adopting a policy now rather than waiting for more information about the impacts of 
warming and their economic consequences. On the other hand, part of the 
atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide is not degradable. Emissions have irreversible 
impacts on the atmosphere, and climate change may well have further irreversible 
impacts. Adopting an abatement policy now rather than later has a sunk benefit, 
because the society is better protected from irreversible environmental damages. 
These opportunity costs (benefits) bias traditional cost-benefit analysis against (in 
favour) of policy adoption. We investigate which bias is stronger. 
In this paper, we limit the response options of decision makers to either doing nothing 
(or rather, waiting for more information about the future) or adopting an 
environmental policy (i.e. reducing emissions / building dikes such that the 
probability of having another catastrophe is equal to zero). We do not distinguish 
between reducing emissions and building dikes. We focus on this second question by 
taking into account irreversibilities under uncertainties, which modify the traditional 
cost-benefit analysis. We then assume that the reduction quantity is already known, 
and that there is an international cooperation in order to reduce emissions: the model 
is global and deals with one decision maker who faces international social costs of 
warming. 
To do so, we use a Real Options model, introduced by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and 
Henry (1974). They show that there is a premium or option value on policies to 
maintain flexibility. We follow Pindyck (2000, 2002) and Saphores (2004): 
irreversibility and environmental uncertainty can strongly influence the timing of 
environmental policy. This policy aims to minimize social costs in the presence of 
continuous and catastrophic damages. In the set-up of Pindyck (2000, 2002; see also 
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; and Yin and Newman, 1996), the probability of a disaster 
only strenghens the discount rate. They show that, if environmental uncertainty 
increases, an investment in emission reduction should be delayed because of sunk 
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emissions may be optimal in order to avoid long-term damages due to the GHGs 
accumulation (i.e., sunk benefits). 
We choose here to consider this kind of problem by focusing on the report of IPCC 
(2001), which highlighted that the extreme weather events have increased in severity 
and frequency during the twentieth century as the atmospheric GHGs concentration 
has gone up. So our aim is to determine what to decide (i.e. when to adopt an 
environmental policy as well as how much GHGs emissions reductions should be 
optimal) according to what has already happened. Baranzini et al. (2003) include the 
possibility of exogenous climatic shocks into a Real Options model. However, the 
probability and magnitude of catastrophes are based on agents’ behaviour, i.e. 
catastrophic risk is endogenous in this area. In Tsur and Zemel (1996) and Fisher and 
Narain (2003), the possibly catastrophic impacts depend on atmospheric gases 
concentration, which in turn depend on emissions and emission control. They also 
distinguished two kinds of catastrophes (high damage and low damage). In this paper, 
we add that the probability of a catastrophe depends on the occurrence of catastrophes 
in previous periods. In this manner, we simulate that an extreme climate scenario, in 
our case the collapse of the West-Antarctic Ice Sheet, would manifest itself through a 
series of floods that would increase in frequency (and intensity) but still be random. 
As in Werey (2000), who studies endogenous probabilities of failures of water hubs, 
we combine Real Options and Operational Research approaches. We compare over 
one hundred years social costs when a policy is adopted (and then no catastrophe 
occurs anymore) and when nothing is done (and then the society has to cope with 
possible disasters that could increase these social costs). We adopt the policy when 
social costs are minimized. 
Other papers on catastrophic risks of climate change include Gjerde et al. (1999) and 
Keller et al. (2004). These papers ignore stochasticity. In return, the representation of 
emission reduction is more sophisticated than what is possible here. 
In Section 2 we present the model, hypotheses and data retained. We state results and 
the sensitivity analysis in Section 3. We conclude in Section 4. 
 
 
2.  The model and data 
 
2.1. The  model 
Cost-benefit analysis is a standard framework to evaluate environmental policies, 
although by no means the only contender. Our cost-benefit model incorporates three 
essential characteristics of the investment problem: 
-  Irreversibilities: On the one hand, costs of an environmental policy are sunk 
for the society; on the other hand, benefits due to an immediate adoption of the 
policy are sunk as well. 
-  Uncertainties over future outcomes: The evolution of the ecosystem is 
uncertain; the evolution of GHGs concentration depends on the 
implementation or not of the environmental policy; frequency and magnitude 
of disasters are uncertain; social costs of climatic changes are unknown. 
  3-  Delay: The adoption on policy can be delayed. 
The model aims to adopt a GHGs abatement policy at the optimal time, i.e. when the 
social costs are minimized (Pindyck 2000, 2002). This decision is unique and is not 
compounded of a series of sequential investment decisions. In contrast to Werey 
(2000), we fix a terminal boundary. The policy has to be adopted no later than year 
100. 
The information structure of the problem is as follows. There is uncertainty on social 
costs and on the probabilities and magnitudes of damages, variables that depend on 
the temperature and so on the concentration of greenhouse gases. 
Let M(t) denote the stock of environmental pollutants.
1 According to Nordhaus 
(1994),
2 the present stock of pollutant M(t) evolves as: 
(1)  [ ] () ( 0 ) () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 0 ) Mt M Et Mt M βα =++ − − −  
where M(0) = 596.4 billions tons of CO2 is the initial stock of CO2; M(t-1) is the stock 
of CO2 at the previous period; E(t) is emissions of CO2; β is the marginal atmospheric 
retention ratio; α is the natural rate at which the stock of CO2 dissipates over time. 
World GDP grows over time at a rate of 2% per year. We express social costs, 
damages and investment costs in percentage of GDP. Emissions E(t) increase over 
time if no policy is implemented: 
(2a)  () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) Et Et δ =+ − 
with δ=0.5% or 1% per year. That is, carbon efficiency improves by 1.0% or 1.5% per 
year. 
When the policy is adopted at time t*, emissions E(t) are reduced by 0.1% or 1.1%. 
Then they begin to grow again but at a lower rate than in the baseline 
(2b) ( *) (1 ) ( * 1) Et Et η =− −with η∈[0.1%;1.1%] 
(2c) ( 1) (1 ) ( ) Et Et γ +=+ for t>t*, with γ<δ and γ=0.1%. 
The costs K of 1% emission reduction are equal to 0.02% GDP (Tol, forthcoming). 
The climate system is characterized by a multi-layer system comprising the 
atmosphere, the mixed layer of oceans and the deep oceans. Nordhaus (1994) 
expresses the temperature evolution of atmosphere and upper oceans by the following 
equation: 
(3a)  [ ] [ ] 12 ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) LO Tt Tt ft Tt Tt T t σλ σ =− + − − − − − −  
where 
1 1 1 R σ =  with R1 the thermal capacity of atmosphere and upper oceans; 
2 R2 2 σ τ =  with R2 the thermal capacity of deep oceans and 
2 1 τ  the transfer rate 
from the upper layer to the lower layer; λ is the climate feedback parameter; 
TLO is the temperature of the deep ocean:  
(3b)  [ ] 3 ( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) LO LO LO TtTt T t Tt σ =− + − −−  
                                                 
1 Note that we use “stock” and “concentration” interchangeably; the two are not the same, but there is a 
one-to-one relationship between them. In the model, we use the stock. 
2 We ignore later, more complicated models of carbon cycle and climate (e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer, 
2000). We only take carbon dioxide into account. 
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32 1 σ τ = . 












  with µ = 0.99. 
The social costs of warming depend on the temperature (cf. Fischer and Narain, 
2003). Climate change brings damages. There are three potential states of nature in 
each year: no catastrophe, mild catastrophe and bad catastrophe. 
Without a catastrophe, damage costs depend on temperature: 
(5)   
2 () Ct c T =
The parameter c is set such that a warming of 3°C implies damages equal to 1% of 
GDP, which roughly corresponds to the values found in the survey by Smith et al. 
(2001). If a mild (bad) catastrophe occurs, the parameter c is multiplied by 3 (11), for 
that year. Note that the damage cost convexity can be interpreted as the risk aversion 
of society against disasters. 
The risk of catastrophic damages is endogenous, in the sense that the probability of 
the damages occurring depends on the stock of GHGs, which is endogenous in our 




The present probability, i.e. for M(0), of a disaster equals 1%. The probability rises to 
5% for 2M(0). So, b(t) evolves over time as 
(7) 
0.5 0.9
log 2log () ( 1 ) 1.5 1.1 () ( 1 ) ( 1 )









If p(t) is the probability to have a disaster at time t, p(t)k(N(t)) is the probability that 
this is a bad disaster, where: 
(8)   with  ( ( )) 0.8 ( ) kNt q Nt =+ ( ( )) [0;1] kNt ∈ , 
The probability of a bad catastrophe increase linearly with the number of bad 
catastrophes in the past (N(t), with 0 ≤ N(t) ≤t ). This is because, once the WAIS starts 
to collapse, chances are it will continue. However, a really bad flood may also just be 
a freak event. A WAIS collapse would manifest itself by bad floods becoming ever 
more common, but the first bad floods are not necessarily a sign that the WAIS is 
collapsing. Note that (  is the conditional probability of a mild catastrophe.  ) 1( ( ) ) kNt −
 
2.2.   Solution 
The decision tree has 100 periods, but we present the two periods case for illustration 
in Figure 1. The squares represent decision nodes (adopting a policy P or not NP), and 
circles represent stochastic nodes (the occurrence of catastrophes D or not ND). 
  5After adopting a policy, emissions, concentrations and temperatures evolve 
differently. CP(t) and CP(t+1) denote the social costs involved by a policy adopted at 
time t. CNP,P(t+1) are social costs when the policy is only adopted at time (t+1), CNP(t) 
and CNP(t+1) are social costs when the policy is not adopted. Note that investment 
costs K are made at the beginning of the period, so they have to be discounted by the 
discount rate r. 
Social costs of damages depend on the number of disasters that have already occurred 
and that modify the probability of having high damages (which involve social costs 
Dh, whereas Dl denotes social costs due to mild damages). So, social damages after 
the occurrence of one catastrophe at time t equal 
(9)  [ ] () (, 1 ) () 1 (, 1 ) () Dh Dt k t Dt k t D t =+ − l  
(The equation is the same at time t+1 when nothing happens at the time t.) The social 
damages after the occurrence of a second catastrophe at time (t+1) when a disaster has 
already arrived at time t equal 
(10)  [ ] (1 ) (1 , 2 )(1 )1 (1 , 2 ) (1 DD h l D t kt D t kt Dt += + ++− + + )  
The optimal strategy minimizes expected net present total costs. It is computed using 
the algorithm of averaging-out-and-folding-back (cf. Appendices A and B). We begin 
by choosing the better solution at nodes 2 and 3 (evaluated at time t=0), which is the 


























   ++ +    ++     

  ++ + + + − ++ +     +  
 


























   ++ +    ++     

  ++ + + + − ++ +     +  
 
Finally at node 1 (evaluated at time t=0), decision makers choose between 
implementing the policy or waiting at time t according to: 
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    ++ +     ++ +   

   ++    +    
    +− +    +    
+
 
Depending on the number of catastrophes that have already happened, we can deduce 
when it is optimal to choose to invest in an environmental policy: when the social 
costs of implementing a policy are inferior to the social costs of waiting. 
We do not evaluate option values here. Option values represent the difference 
between results of one shot analysis (i.e. either investing right now or never, result 
evaluated by the Net Present Value) and a sequential decision framework. Decision 
for first period is affected by the prospect of future learning about climatic events. 
Option values are positive if more development proceeds with more complete 
information than without it. We know that in case of options to invest, option values 
are always positive even with risk aversion (cf. Pindyck, 2002). It is worth to take into 
account the occurrence of information to the future. See for example 
Schimmelpfennig (1995)  who evaluates option values in a two periods framework of 
two possible choices. 
 
2.3.   Data and parameters 
We calibrate our model on the basis of hypotheses and results obtained by Nordhaus 




3.   Results 
 
Table 2 shows the optimal time of investment as a function of the number of 
catastrophes occurring. For comparison, Table 2 also displays the marginal, net 
present cost of waiting and policy implementation. Decision makers start choosing 
between implementation and waiting for further information at t=0. At the optimal 
time t
*, the costs of implementing an environmental policy are always lower than 
costs of waiting. 
Costs fall if the number of catastrophes decreases, and implementing is postponed 
policy. If no catastrophe occurs, it is better to wait to time t=100. That is, catastrophes 
are the main reason for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in our model. 
The optimal time to implement a policy is equal to 59 when 59 catastrophes have 
already occurred; to 58 when 57 or 56 catastrophes have already occurred; and to 59 
when 56, 55 or 54 catastrophes have already occurred. This is due to the probability of 
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catastrophes are very numerous, the probability of having another one is very similar 
regardless of the exact number of previous catastrophes. Therefore, the costs of 
waiting can be lower than the costs of implementing a policy (which takes into 
account the capital costs). Decision makers can invest later (at t*=59 instead 58). 
However, generally, emission reduction is postponed to later periods if fewer 
catastrophes occur. The earliest time for abatement is after 58 years, which is 
relatively late. Therefore, emission reduction is not used to prevent a WAIS collapse, 
but only to reduce damages. 
Table 3 contains the results of a sensitivity analysis. Emission reduction is 
implemented earlier if (1) the costs of emission abatement are lower and (2) the time 
horizon is shorter. If emissions grow faster, less catastrophes are needed to induce 
implementation. 
Uncertainty gives rise to two different issues. One relates to risk aversion. The fact 
that one cannot undo past emission reduction or actively remove carbon from the 
atmosphere is irrelevant to the optimal regulatory strategy (Kolstad, 1996). One 
relates to uncertainty where that uncertainty is being resolved over time, i.e. 
information is being acquired over time. The literature on irreversibilities tells us that 
with learning, we should avoid decisions that restrict future options. 
The results obtained with the assumption of risk aversion prove that an environmental 
policy involves two kinds of irreversibilities that work in opposite directions: 
-  Sunk costs associated with an environment regulation: policies aimed at 
reducing ecological damage impose sunk costs on society; 
-  Sunk benefits of avoided environmental degradation: environmental damage 
can be partially or totally irreversible. So adopting a policy now rather than 
waiting has a sunk benefit (a negative opportunity cost).When there is no GDP 
growth over time, implementation is earlier. A higher discount rate implies earlier 
implementation. Note that lower (or no) economic growth and a higher (consumption) 
discount rate are equivalent. A higher discount rate implies reduced care for the 
future. The higher preference for the present is equivalent to a lower value for the 
future, i.e. a lower value of waiting for more information. Finally, the option value 
decreases and decision makers invest earlier. Emission reduction is implemented 
earlier. 
Table 3 also shows that, if there are no catastrophes or if the catastrophes are not 
serially correlated (that is, no WAIS collapse), emission reduction is postponed. That 
is, the possibility of a WAIS collapse increases optimal emission reduction. 
Emission reduction is postponed too, if the policy intervention is adaptation (dike 
building) rather than mitigation (emission reduction). This is because mitigation 
would reduce the probability of catastrophes as well as non-catastrophic damages, 
whereas adaptation would reduce the damage due to catastrophes only. 
Finally, Table 3 shows that the date of implementation is independent of the intensity 
of emission reduction. However, social costs decrease with higher emission reduction. 
The base case policy of Table 2 may be optimal in the timing, but not in the level of 
emission abatement. 
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4.   Concluding remarks 
 
We use a stylized model of the costs and benefits of emission reduction, with large 
and endogenous uncertainty, with irreversible emission reduction and irreversible 
climate change impacts, to assess the optimal timing of policy. This was done before. 
However, we introduce serial correlation into the stochastic process that generates 
catastrophes, increasing the irreversibility on the climate change impact side. In this 
manner, we approximate the effects of a possible collapse of the West-Antarctic Ice 
Sheet. 
We confirm the findings of previous studies that catastrophic risks justify greenhouse 
gas emission reduction. We extend that result to show that catastrophic scenarios 
(here represented as serially correlated catastrophic risks) justify even greater 
emission reduction. 
The model used is highly stylised. One improvement would be to include 
technological progress. If endogenous and irreversible – both reasonable assumptions 
– the model dynamics would be more complicated still, and the results may differ.  
Other improvements include a better parameterisation of the model and a more 
realistic representation of the physical and economic processes. A greater intellectual 
challenge is to merge our approach, which emphasizes stochasticity, sunk costs and 
the timing of policy but has a static and discrete representation of emission reduction, 
with the alternative school of decision making under catastrophic risk (e.g., Keller et 
al., 2004), which has dynamic and continuous emission reduction but downplays 
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  10Table 1. Parameters, values, and sources. 
Parameters Initial  values  References 
Atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases 
M(0) 
(billions tons of CO2 equivalent) 
785.3 Fisher-Narain  (2003) 
Initial atmospheric temperature T(0) 
(Celsius degrees) 
0.58 Fisher-Narain  (2003) 
Initial ocean temperature TLO(0) (Celsius 
degrees) 
0.07 Fisher-Narain  (2003) 
Emissions 6.1587  Nordhaus-Boyer  (2000) 
Emissions growth rate, δ  0.005 This  study 
If an environmental policy is implemented 






Costs of a policy adoption K (% GDP) for 
1% emissions reduction 
0.02 Tol  (forthcoming) 
Social costs of pollution c (1% GDP when 
T=3) 
0.001 Nordhaus  (1994) 
Damage costs      
 h (10% GDP when T=3)  0.01  This study 
 l (2% GDP when T=3)  0.002  This study 
Discount rate r (%)  5  This study 
GNP growth rate, gnp   0.02  This study 
Various parameters for gas concentration evolution 
a (between 0 and 1)  0.02  Nordhaus (1994) 
β  0.9 Nordhaus  (1994) 
σ1  0.1 Nordhaus  (1994) 
σ2  0.1 Nordhaus  (1994) 
σ3  0.1 Nordhaus  (1994) 
λ  0.1 Nordhaus  (1994) 
µ  0.99 Nordhaus  (1994) 
Initial parameters of probabilities of catastrophes 
Initial probability of a WAIS collapse  0.001  This study 
Initial probability of a disaster, p(0) 0.1  This  study 
Initial probability that this disaster provokes 
a high-costly damage 
0.1 This  study 
 
  11Table 2. Optimal time of investment. 
Number of catastrophes 
already happened before 
implementing the policy 
Optimal time t
* 















    
0 59  t
*=59 0.03524480  0.03663589 
1-2 57-56  t
*=58 0.03626460  0.03683871 
3-5 56-54  t
*=59 0.03524480  0.03663589 
6-9 54-51  t
*=60 0.03423276  0.03561851 
10-12 51-49  t
*=61 0.03322862  0.03460699 
13-15 49-47  t
*=62 0.03223248  0.03360323 
16-18 47-45  t
*=63 0.03124445  0.03260736 
19-20 45-44  t
*=64 0.03026464  0.03161948 
21-23 44-42  t
*=65 0.02929313  0.03063971 
24-26 42-40  t
*=66 0.02833001  0.02966812 
27-28 40-39  t
*=67 0.02737534  0.02870480 
29-31 39-37  t
*=68 0.02642919  0.02774984 
32-33 37-36  t
*=69 0.02549162  0.02680330 
34-36 36-34  t
*=70 0.02456267  0.02586523 
37-38 34-33  t
*=71 0.02364240  0.02493569 
39-40 33-32  t
*=72 0.02273083  0.02401473 
41-43 32-30  t
*=73 0.02182800  0.02310239 
44-45 30-29  t
*=74 0.02093391  0.02219868 
46-47 29-28  t
*=75 0.02004859  0.02130364 
48-49 28-27  t
*=76 0.01917205  0.02041729 
50-51 27-26  t
*=77 0.01830428  0.01953963 
52-54 26-24  t
*=78 0.01744528  0.01867066 
55-56 24-23  t
*=79 0.01659503  0.01781039 
57-58 23-22  t
*=80 0.01575352  0.01695880 
59-60 22-21  t
*=81 0.01492072  0.01611588 
61-62 21-20  t
*=82 0.01409661  0.01528161 
63-64 20-19  t
*=83 0.01328115  0.01445595 
65-66 19-18  t
*=84 0.01247429  0.01363888 
67-68 18-17  t
*=85 0.01167600  0.01283036 
69-70 17-16  t
*=86 0.01088622  0.01203035 
71-72 16-15  t
*=87 0.01010489  0.01123879 
73-74 15-14  t
*=88 0.00933195  0.01045563 
75-76 14-13  t
*=89 0.00856734  0.00968082 
77-79 13-11  t
*=90 0.00781099  0.00891428 
80 11  t
*=91 0.00706281  0.00815596 
81-83 11-9  t
*=92 0.00632274  0.00740576 
84 9  t
*=93 0.00559068  0.00666363 
85-87 9-7  t
*=94 0.00486654  0.00592947 
88-89 7-6  t
*=95 0.00415023  0.00520320 
90-91 6-5  t
*=96 0.00344166  0.00448472 
92-93 5-4  t
*=97 0.00274071  0.00377394 
  1294-95 4-3  t
*=98 0.00204729  0.00307076 
96-98 3-1  t
*=99 0.00136128  0.00243827 
 
  13Table 3. Sensitivity analysis 
Variations of parameters  t
* compared to t
*=59  Value of implementing 
the policy at time t
* 
Costs of capital K=0.001% (<) 




for 0-2 no catastrophes and 
58-56 catastrophes 
< 
Costs of capital K=0.01% (<) for 
1% emission reduction 
= < 
Costs of capital K=0.1% (>) for 
1% emission reduction 
= > 
Costs of capital K=1% (>) for 
1% emission reduction 
> > 
Risk neutrality  <  > 
Discount rate r=4% (<)  >  > 
Discount rate r=8% (>)  <  < 
No GNP growth (<)  < 
t
*=46 




GNP growth rate gnp=4% (>)  > 
t
*=70 




No GNP growth and a lower 








No GNP growth and a higher 








T=95 (<)  < 
t
*=57 
for 0-4 no catastrophes and 
57-53 catastrophes 
< 
T=105 (>)  >  > 
Emissions growth of 
0.6% (>)  = 
t
*=58 












for 0-4 no catastrophes and 
> 










for 0 no catastrophes and 
59 catastrophes 
< 
Emissions growth after policy    
0.0005 (<)  < 
t
*=58 
for 0-2 no catastrophes and 
58-56 catastrophes 
< 




for 0-4 no catastrophes and 
59-55 catastrophes 
> 
Catastrophes    
No catastrophe at all  > 
t
*=85 














*   > 
t
*=85 




Probability of a bad catastrophe q (k(1)=0.9 and k(2)=1) 
0.05 (<)  =  < 
0.15 (>)  < 
t
*=58 
for 0-2 no catastrophes and 
58-56 catastrophes 
< 
Probability of a bad catastrophe q (k(1) and k(2) are adjusted) 
0.05 (<)(k(1)=0.85 and k(2)=1)  =  = 
0.15 (>)(k(1)=0.95 and k(2)=1)  < 
t
*=58 
for 0-2 no catastrophes and 
58-56 catastrophes 
> 
Evolution of the probability of a bad catastrophe k(1) and k(2) 
k(1)=0.8 (<) and k(2)=1  =  = 
k(1)=1 (>) and k(2)=1  = 
t
*=59 
for 0-1 no catastrophes and 
> 
  1559-58 catastrophes 
Emissions reduction of     
0.1% (<)  =  > 
0.03526846 
0.2% =  > 
0.03526610 
0.3% =  > 
0.03526373 
0.4% =  > 
0.03526137 
0.5% =  > 
0.03525900 
0.6% =  > 
0.03525664 
0.7% =  > 
0.03525427 
0.8% =  > 
0.03525190 
0.9% =  > 
0.03524954 
1.0% =  > 
0.03524717 
1.2% (>)  =  < 
0.03524243 
1.3% =  < 
0.03524006 
 
* Only building dikes means that there is neither emission reduction nor different 
growth path after implementing the policy. Note that here we conserve the same 
capital costs as for implementing a policy to reduce 1.1% of emissions. 
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Figure 1. The sequential decision framework over two periods. 
  17Appendix A: Model Code : Temporal variables for backward induction 
 
set numb /0*99/; 
parameter val(numb),val2(numb); 
val(numb) = ord(numb); 




file temp /timemap.gms/; 
put  temp; 
 
temp.nd = 0; 
temp.nw = 0; 
temp.tw = 0; 
temp.lw = 0; 
 
PUT 'SET ' /; 
PUT ' TIME Forward looking time' /; 
PUT '  /' /; 
LOOP(numb, 
 put @4 'time',val(numb),' Time period ',val(numb) /; ); 
PUT '  /' /; 
 
PUT ' INVTIME backward looking time' /; 
PUT '  /' /; 
LOOP(numb, 
 put @4 'invtime',val(numb),' Backward time period ',val(numb) /; ); 
PUT '  /' /; 
 
PUT ' TIMEMAP(TIME,INVTIME)' /; 
PUT '  /' /; 
LOOP(numb, 
 put @4 'time',val(numb),'.invtime',val2(numb) /; ); 
PUT '  /' /; 
PUT ';' /; 


































K PV of cost of policy adoption (0.02% GDP for 1% emission reduction) 
 /0.00022/ 
social_cost social costs of pollution (1% GDP when T is equal to 3) 
 /0.001/ 
h2 coeff of high damage (10% GDP when T is equal to 3) 
 /0.01/ 
l2 coeff of low damage (2% GDP when T is equal to 3) 
 /0.002/ 
discount_rate discount rate 
 /0.05/ 
emission_0 emission rate 
 /6.1587/ 
emission_growth emissions grow over time (0.5% or 1%) 
 /0.005/ 
reduction_rate between 0.1% and 1.1% 
 /0.011/ 
  19discrete_step 
 /0.001/ 
concentration_0 value at time1 (billions tons of CO2 equivalent) 
 /785.3/ 
temp_0 initial atmospheric temperature at time1 (Celsius degrees) 
 /0.58/ 







f(time) in order to transform the gas concentration in temperature (without others 
GHGs and aerosols eg DICE) 
h(time) idem for equations without emission 
x(time,statevariable) physical state indexes (gas concentration temperature damages 
and probability of such damages) 
y(time,ecovariable) social costs (due to pollution or catastrophe) 
action(time,decision,numb_catastrophes) 






timevalue(time) the time value (equal to 0 at time1) 
invtimevalue(invtime) 












lastime(time) = no; 









  20x("time1","probability")= 2 / (1+exp(-





















 y(timebis,"gdp") $ (timevalue(timebis) EQ timevalue("time1"))= 1; 





 x(timebis,"concentration_we") $ (timevalue(timebis) EQ timevalue("time1")) = 
concentration_0; 
 x(timebis,"discrete_growth") $ (timevalue(timebis) EQ timevalue("time1")) = 
emission_0*(1-reduction_rate); 
 x(timebis,"discrete_growth") $ (timevalue(timebis) GT timevalue("time1")  ) = 
x(timebis-1,"discrete_growth")*(1+ discrete_step); 
 x(timebis,"concentration_we") $ (timevalue(timebis) GT timevalue("time1")) = 596.4 
+ beta * x(timebis,"discrete_growth") + (1-absorption) * (x(timebis-
1,"concentration_we")- 596.4); 
 h(timebis) = nu*(log(x(timebis,"concentration_we")/596.4)/log(2)); 
 x(timebis,"temperature_we") $ (timevalue(timebis) EQ timevalue("time1")) 
=temp_0; 
 x(timebis,"temperature_we") $ (timevalue(timebis) GT timevalue("time1")) = 
x(timebis-1,"temperature_we") + sigma1*(h(timebis)-lambda* x(timebis-
1,"temperature_we")-sigma2*(x(timebis-1,"temperature_we")-x(timebis-
1,"temperature_LOwe"))); 
 x(time,"temperature_LOwe") $ (timevalue(timebis) EQ timevalue("time1")) 
=temp_LO_0; 
 x(time,"temperature_LOwe") $ (timevalue(timebis) GT timevalue("time1")) = 
x(timebis-1,"temperature_LOwe")+sigma3*(x(timebis-1,"temperature_we")-
x(timebis-1,"temperature_LOwe")); 
  21 y(timebis,"cumulated_costs") $ (timevalue(timebis) EQ timevalue("time1")) = 
K*y(timebis,"gdp") * (1/(1+discount_rate))**(timevalue("time1")) + (social_cost 
*y(timebis,"gdp"))* (x(timebis,"temperature_we")**2) * 
(1/(1+discount_rate))**(timevalue("time1")+1); 
 y(timebis,"cumulated_costs") $ (timevalue(timebis) GT timevalue("time1")) = 
y(timebis-1,"cumulated_costs") + (social_cost * y(timebis,"gdp"))* 
(x(timebis,"temperature_we")**2) * (1/(1+discount_rate))**(timevalue(timebis)+1); 
); 
 
y("time1","policy") = sum(lastime,y(lastime,"cumulated_costs")); 
 
action(time,decision,numb_catastrophes) = no; 
action2(invtime,decision,numb_catastrophes) = no; 
 
loop (timemap(time,invtime) 
         $ (timevalue(time) GT 0), 
 
 x(time,"growth") $ (timevalue(time) GT 0) = x(time-
1,"growth")*(1+emission_growth); 
 x(time,"concentration") = 596.4 + beta * x(time,"growth") + (1-absorption) * 
(x(time-1,"concentration")-596.4); 
 f(time) = nu*(log(x(time,"concentration")/596.4)/log(2)); 
 x(time,"temperature") = x(time-1,"temperature") + sigma1*(f(time)-lambda* x(time-
1,"temperature")-sigma2*(x(time-1,"temperature")-x(time-1,"temperature_LO"))); 
 x(time,"temperature_LO") = x(time-1,"temperature_LO")+sigma3*(x(time-
1,"temperature")-x(time-1,"temperature_LO")); 
 x(time,"para_prob") $ (timevalue(time) GT 0) = x(time-1,"para_prob")+ x(time-
1,"para_prob")*((x(time,"concentration")-x(time-1,"concentration"))/x(time-
1,"concentration"))* ((log (0.5/1.5) -2 * log (0.9/1.1) ) / (2*log (0.9/1.1) ) ); 
 x(time,"probability") = 2 / (1+exp(-x(time,"para_prob") * x(time,"concentration"))) - 
1; 
 y(time,"high_damage") = (h2*y(time,"gdp"))* (x(time,"temperature"))**2; 




 loop (timebis 
         $ (timevalue(timebis) GE timevalue(time)), 
 
  x(timebis,"discrete_growth") $ (timevalue(timebis) EQ timevalue(time)) = 
x(timebis,"growth")*(1-reduction_rate); 
  x(timebis,"discrete_growth") $ (timevalue(timebis) GT timevalue(time) ) = 
x(timebis-1,"discrete_growth")*(1+ discrete_step); 
  x(timebis,"concentration_we") $ (timevalue(timebis) EQ timevalue(time)) = 596.4 + 
beta * x(timebis,"discrete_growth") + (1-absorption) * (x(time-1,"concentration")- 
596.4); 
  x(timebis,"concentration_we") $ (timevalue(timebis) GT timevalue(time)) = 596.4 + 
beta * x(timebis,"discrete_growth") + (1-absorption) * (x(time-
1,"concentration_we")- 596.4); 
  h(timebis) = nu*(log(x(timebis,"concentration_we")/596.4)/log(2)); 
  22  x(timebis,"temperature_we") $ (timevalue(timebis) EQ timevalue(time)) =x(time-
1,"temperature"); 
  x(timebis,"temperature_we") $ (timevalue(timebis) GT timevalue(time)) = 
x(timebis-1,"temperature_we") + sigma1*(h(timebis)-lambda* x(timebis-
1,"temperature_we")-sigma2*(x(timebis-1,"temperature_we")-x(timebis-
1,"temperature_LOwe"))); 
  x(time,"temperature_LOwe") $ (timevalue(timebis) EQ timevalue(time)) =x(time-
1,"temperature_LO"); 
  x(time,"temperature_LOwe") $ (timevalue(timebis) GT timevalue(time)) = 
x(timebis-1,"temperature_LOwe")+sigma3*(x(timebis-1,"temperature_we")-
x(timebis-1,"temperature_LOwe")); 
  y(timebis,"cumulated_costs") $ (timevalue(timebis) EQ timevalue(time)) = 
K*y(timebis,"gdp") * (1/(1+discount_rate))**(timevalue(timebis)) + 
(social_cost*y(timebis,"gdp")) * (x(timebis,"temperature_we")**2) * 
(1/(1+discount_rate))**(timevalue(timebis)+1); 
  y(timebis,"cumulated_costs") $ (timevalue(timebis) GT timevalue(time)) = 
y(timebis-1,"cumulated_costs") + (social_cost*y(timebis,"gdp")) * 
(x(timebis,"temperature_we")**2) * ((1/(1+discount_rate))**(timevalue(timebis)+1)); 
 ); 
 














 action2("invtime1","reduce_emissions",numb_catastrophes) = yes; 










    $(numbvalue(numb_catastrophes) GE 1), 
 
 x2("invtime2","modified_probability") $ ((numbvalue(numb_catastrophes))  EQ 1) = 
0.9; 
  23 x2("invtime2","modified_probability") $ ((numbvalue(numb_catastrophes))  EQ 0) = 
0.1; 
 x2("invtime2","modified_probability") $ ( numbvalue(numb_catastrophes) GE 2) = 
1; 







 z2("invtime2","implement",numb_catastrophes-1) = y2("invtime2","policy"); 
 z2("invtime2","min",numb_catastrophes-1) $ ( 
z2("invtime2","implement",numb_catastrophes-1) LE 
z2("invtime2","wait",numb_catastrophes-1) ) = 
z2("invtime2","implement",numb_catastrophes-1); 
 z2("invtime2","min",numb_catastrophes-1) $ ( 
z2("invtime2","implement",numb_catastrophes-1) GT 
z2("invtime2","wait",numb_catastrophes-1) ) = 
z2("invtime2","wait",numb_catastrophes-1); 
 action2("invtime2","reduce_emissions",numb_catastrophes-1) $( 
z2("invtime2","implement",numb_catastrophes-1) LE 
z2("invtime2","wait",numb_catastrophes-1) ) = yes; 
 action2("invtime2","do_nothing",numb_catastrophes-1) $( 
z2("invtime2","implement",numb_catastrophes-1) GT 
z2("invtime2","wait",numb_catastrophes-1) ) = yes; 
 action("time99","reduce_emissions",numb_catastrophes-1)$( 
z2("invtime2","implement",numb_catastrophes-1) LE 
z2("invtime2","wait",numb_catastrophes-1) ) = yes; 
 action("time99","do_nothing",numb_catastrophes-1) $( 
z2("invtime2","implement",numb_catastrophes-1) GT 




        $ (invtimevalue(invtime) LT invtimevalue("invtime2") ), 
 
 loop (numb_catastrophes 
         $(numbvalue(numb_catastrophes) LE (invtimevalue(invtime))), 
 
  x2(invtime,"modified_probability") $ ((numbvalue(numb_catastrophes))  EQ 1) = 
0.9; 
  x2(invtime,"modified_probability") $ ((numbvalue(numb_catastrophes))  EQ 0) = 
0.1; 
  x2(invtime,"modified_probability") $ ( numbvalue(numb_catastrophes) GE 2) = 1; 









  z2(invtime,"implement",numb_catastrophes) = y2(invtime,"policy"); 
  z2(invtime,"min",numb_catastrophes) $ ( 
z2(invtime,"implement",numb_catastrophes) LE 
z2(invtime,"wait",numb_catastrophes) ) = 
z2(invtime,"implement",numb_catastrophes); 
  z2(invtime,"min",numb_catastrophes) $ ( 
z2(invtime,"implement",numb_catastrophes) GT 
z2(invtime,"wait",numb_catastrophes) ) = z2(invtime,"wait",numb_catastrophes); 
  action2(invtime,"reduce_emissions",numb_catastrophes) $( 
z2(invtime,"implement",numb_catastrophes) LE 
z2(invtime,"wait",numb_catastrophes) ) = yes; 
  action2(invtime,"do_nothing",numb_catastrophes) $( 
z2(invtime,"implement",numb_catastrophes) GT 
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